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Terrorist attacks have made security preparedness unquestionably necessary in all cities. 
While major metropolitan areas have long recognized that their global visibility has required 
strong security operations, many medium-sized cities, specifically those of the U.S. and 
European Union, now face the need to establish transportation security frameworks for the 
first time. This paper assesses the resources available to help medium-sized cities begin the 
task of creating such systems. This assessment presents infrastructure risk assessment tools, 
identifies infrastructure and funding resources, and creates a process for developing a 
security framework to connect agencies responsible for transportation security in these 
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metropolitan areas. Descriptions of transportation security framework practices at the 
national level had led to the preparation of a transportation security framework for 
Greenville, South Carolina, USA, to serve as a prototype that other medium-sized cities can 
emulate. This security framework can serve as either a checklist to ensure security coverage 
in existing asset management systems and intelligent transportation systems architectures 
such as those frequently used in the U.S., Europe, and Japan, or it can provide baseline 
structure for developing a new transportation security framework for cities in developing 
countries.    
 
Keywords: Transportation security frameworks, medium-sized cities, urban security, 
emergency planning 
1. Introduction 
Worldwide, terrorist attacks on transportation systems since 2000 have more than doubled 
compared to the 1990s. The attacks have further spread to smaller targets and smaller cities. 
In 2006, several terrorist attacks focused on medium-sized cities (considered here to have a 
population between 50,000 and 1,000,000) and included Chapel Hill, North Carolina; Kufa, 
Iraq; Dortmund and Koblenz, Germany; Kandar, Afghanistan; and Tiraspol, Moldova. All of 
these attacks focused on smaller targets using cars and car-bombs, suitcase-bombs, suicide 
bombers, and grenades, as weapons (U.S. Department of State, 2003). 
The United States (U.S.) and other global leaders must adapt to the changing security 
environment involving medium-sized cities. Developing a security framework for existing 
and proposed transportation systems can aid in the development and coordination of security 
plans between many stakeholders and maintain the vitality of the transportation industry and 
therefore global commerce. Since the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001, the 
Transportation Security Administration in the U.S., has formed and allocated large amounts 
of money for shoring transportation infrastructure and systems against human threats, but this 
funding has not resulted in noticeable security improvements in all modes of transportation 
and for all areas of America. Although costly in delay and capital, airport security is 
receiving much attention to balance risks and costs. Because there is currently no other 
transportation mode that offers the same travel speeds, increased security procedures will not 
quickly compromise the airline industry’s market share of the general population for long-
distance routes. Public transit systems, however, do not have this luxury and must continue to 
offer easy access to maintain passenger ridership. Road infrastructure is similarly difficult to 
secure due to its massive network size. Unique security challenges also exist in rail and 
maritime shipping. Regardless of mode, transportation system designers and operators must 
broaden their focus from mobility and speed to include more security and safety (Okasaki, 
2003).  
Major metropolitan areas, such as New York City and Paris, have long recognized that global 
prominence makes them targets for terrorist attacks, but the threats of the War on Terror 
reach into the depths of countries. The September 11th terrorist attacks primarily targeted 
average citizens, and average cities also need to be prepared. Just as increased security on 
airlines preceded a shift of terrorism to surface modes, increased security in and around large 
cities since September 11th could shift some terrorist focus toward medium-sized cities. With 
the demonstrated targeting of transportation systems, agencies responsible for these systems 
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in populated areas of all sizes need to implement security measures and prepare for 
previously unimaginable events.  
Although medium-sized cities have more limited resources to fight terrorism, they also have a 
smaller number of targets to protect and a relatively smaller number of stakeholders to 
coordinate. Establishing transportation security frameworks in these cities could save lives if 
universally adopted by all transportation-related agencies. Although local leaders in medium-
sized cities might now approach the concept of transportation security frameworks for the 
first time, a number of resources already exist to launch such systems. Cities with asset 
management systems or intelligent transportation systems (ITS) architectures might turn to 
these resources to enhance security and expand coverage.  
This paper assumes that significant risks to medium-sized cities justify security planning and 
adequate resources exist to develop security frameworks to mitigate these risks. The 
objectives of this paper are to:  
1. present infrastructure risk assessment tools available for medium-sized cities,  
2. identify infrastructure and funding resources available to medium-sized cities for 
addressing the risks, and  
3. create a process for developing a security framework that applies available resources 
for mitigating risks.  
The last objective, perhaps the most significant one, will be met by both discussion and the 
presentation of a case study of Greenville, South Carolina, U.S. 
1.1 Infrastructure Risk Assessment Tools 
Asset management programs are used in 75 percent of medium-sized U.S. cities (Wittwer et 
al., 2003) to maintain and best-manage their public infrastructure. Such programs will aid in 
the development and maintenance of a security framework because key public locations are 
already identified and monitored in some manner. Because security requires the proper 
selection of areas to protect, choosing high-risk locations for protection requires a careful 
selection process.  
One strategy for the best allocation of funding in the protection of vital transportation 
facilities from terrorism considers the likelihood of the hazard occurring, the socio-economic 
importance of the facility, and the consequences of hazards (King et al., 2003). While this 
method was founded on intrinsic principles of natural hazard risk assessment, specifically 
earthquakes, the identification of key infrastructure is the same for human-made disasters as 
they share the same need for an objective assessment of risk. 
Similarly, Hood et al. (2003) suggest identifying vulnerability through an integrated 
transportation analysis approach, considering vehicle, user, infrastructure, social setting, and 
environment as elements. While this approach seemingly requires a large amount of data, it 
provides exercises that stakeholders can use to identify these elements and their associated 
vulnerabilities or threats. This integrated transportation analysis approach was applied at the 
state level to New Mexico, but appears to readily apply to medium-sized cities. 
Another framework for risk assessment focusing on highway sections uses both static and 
dynamic data. The static data can include infrastructure characteristics and the dynamic data 
can include traffic volumes and weather conditions. These factors are important because 
high-volume freeway links pose high risks for attacks and because weather, such as wind 
direction, might play a significant role during attacks using biological weapons or fire. The 
framework produces a risk score for each highway element based on the static data, dynamic 
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data, and terrorist attack potential. This risk score allows a systematic ranking of the highway 
elements or sections (Xia et al., 2005). Due to a heavy reliance on highways in medium-sized 
cities, this method is particularly applicable, but the technologies associated with modern 
transportation coordination require attention as well. 
Another favoured risk assessment methodology focuses on traffic management centres (TMC) 
involved in real-time traffic monitoring. This risk assessment methodology includes asset 
identification, vulnerability assessment, threat assessment, consequence assessment, and 
countermeasure development (Rowshan et al., 2005). Many medium-sized cities operate 
TMCs to manage and control traffic in real-time to mitigate traffic congestion and to improve 
safety. As intelligent transportation systems (ITS) continue to gain momentum, the use of 
TMCs is likely to become more important for medium-sized cities.  
The American Association of State Highway Transportation Officials’ (AASHTO) Guide to 
Highway Vulnerability Assessment for Critical Asset Identification and Protection (SAIC, 
2002) also provides methods of risk assessment, weighing vulnerability against criticality, 
and suggests possible countermeasures, such as motion-activated video systems. This source 
also provides a quantitative method for ranking the importance of security needs.  
Because each security situation is unique in scope and focus, all available methods should be 
examined to determine the best tool for a given job. Medium-sized cities with massive 
amounts of transportation infrastructure will likely encounter difficulty ranking their security 
needs and should review the methods presented by SAIC (2002) and Hood et al. (2003). 
Cities with less transportation infrastructure will not likely need such data-intensive 
procedures and might use a hybrid of several methods, for example, referring to Rowshan et 
al. (2005) when focusing on a traffic management centre and Hood et al. (2003) to guide 
table top exercises to identify and rank other security needs. 
1.2 Infrastructure and Funding Resources 
Currently, funding from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is distributed by 
state. Most states with only medium-sized cities receive no funding from the DHS Urban 
Areas Security Initiative (DHS, 2005). Many other grants in the U.S. are based on a formulas 
developed by the DHS. One formula weighs critical infrastructure, threat intelligence, and 
population density to distribute funding between states and/or cities. The formula aims at 
protecting the most people and the largest amount of vital infrastructure (DHS, 2005). 
Unfortunately, this formula favours larger metropolitan areas, leaving populations of 
medium-sized cities to fall another step behind larger metropolitan areas in protection. Non-
traditional sources of funding that require further investigation, might include local gas taxes, 
city sales taxes or dedicated state revenue sources.  
In the U.S., one contact person in each state receives funding from the DHS and bears 
responsibility for distributing that funding as equitably as possible to the variety of small, 
medium, and large cities unique to that state (DHS, 2007). While communication differences 
exist between states, perhaps a greater challenge exists in that the one contact person for each 
state must recognize and manage the security needs of cities of various sizes. Large cities 
typically receive focused attention; however, each city within a state should benefit from the 
needed communication with the DHS regardless of city size. The current organizational 
structure theoretically provides medium-sized cities with similar opportunities for 
communication with DHS as small and large cities have. Despite the equivalent 
communication possibilities, the practice of interaction reveals an important difference: 
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communication and coordination are more easily accomplished within medium cities than in 
large cities; however, funding and infrastructure assessment are less likely. 
Since funding for large-scale security systems is not as likely for medium-sized cities as for 
larger ones, solidifying communication protocols is a more realistic outcome. Best practices 
in transportation recognize the importance of communication and coordination, and state-of-
the-practice transportation systems have appeared throughout the U.S. and Europe with 
multimodal facilities and systems for passengers and freight. The coordination of systems 
creates efficiency and benefits for commerce, society, and the environment; however, as 
transportation system users share transportation links, security failures on any given link can 
have ramifications on a larger number of system users. Given that providing an 
interconnected system requires multiple agencies, these agencies must communicate and 
coordinate to ensure transportation security preparedness. 
For example, current freight transportation systems are highly interconnected and cargo often 
travels on several different modes to reach its destination. The use of multiple trip segments 
can cause both mode transfers and security breeches, which can take two forms. First, if 
security is increased on one mode while another mode makes no changes, freight operators 
might change modes to avoid security delays. Conversely, a lack of security on one mode can 
threaten several others because the cargo might not be inspected upon mode change. Because 
medium-sized cities have less redundancy and mode choice, security incidents occurring on 
one mode might cause extensive disruptions, not only on other modes, but potentially on 
neighbouring cities that depend on the same transportation infrastructure. To prevent security 
breaches, a consistent quality of security between various modes and stakeholders must be 
maintained (Guerroro and Rabkin, 2004). This consistency is difficult to achieve because 
stakeholders have varying security interests, standards, and goals.  
A transportation security framework can establish responsibility designations among 
stakeholders to help maintain consistent security preparations and divide security needs into 
smaller, more manageable projects. Development of a transportation security framework will 
also address conflicts between safety and security plans. For example, placing a label on the 
side of a tanker truck indicating flammable freight can improve safety for incident response 
personnel, but it degrades security by labelling a potential target (Guerroro and Rabkin, 
2004). A transportation security framework emerges from agencies achieving agreement on 
policies such as whether or how to display a label for flammable freight. 
As previously discussed, medium-sized cities have fewer responsible agencies than large 
cities which simplifies the amounts and types of communication and coordination that need 
to take place during and after security incidents. A simpler communication network requires 
less planning and fewer resources and results in a simpler, more adaptable, security 
framework. Because the security industry must constantly evolve to maintain its 
effectiveness, security plans and sometimes frameworks must adapt as well. Therefore; 
medium-sized cities have an adaptability advantage over large cities due to their less-complex 
frameworks.  
2. Process for Developing a Security Framework 
A security framework identifies the types of information that needs to be communicated 
between agencies before, during, and after an emergency. These agencies could include local 
and state police, fire departments, emergency management centres, traffic management 
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centres, and the media. This section first reviews previous security framework endeavours 
and then creates a simple process for developing a security framework. The latter will be 
presented in two parts, first explaining the process and then presenting a case study as an 
example. 
2.1 State of Knowledge of Security Frameworks 
Across the U.S., several agencies at varying levels of geography have formed a base of 
experience from which medium-sized cities can draw lessons. Although much of this 
experience has occurred at the state level, the principles demonstrated at this level can 
transfer to the regions around medium-sized cities. Key themes include the need for strong 
inter-organizational leadership, even partial security planning provides benefits, designating 
responsibilities and procedures is key, and sharing security information can provide multiple 
benefits. 
In an effort to depict state security interdependencies, New Mexico’s Security Task Force 
developed the Interdependent Systems Framework. This framework development showed the 
need for dynamic planning and inter-organizational leadership and action. Developing an 
effective security framework requires the cooperation of many organizations, both public and 
private, at many levels (Sobel et al., 2005). Since each organization might have unique 
opinions and objectives, this process is often challenging. While New Mexico’s security 
framework included transportation infrastructure as one of many components, when focusing 
specifically on surface transportation security, the agencies involved will change, but the 
need for strong inter-organizational leadership remains.  
During the emergency of September 11, 2001, Virginia’s State-wide Transportation 
Emergency Operations Centre showed that a security framework, even with limited scope, 
can facilitate efficient coordinated responses. Although no complete security framework 
existed on that day, prior preparations for lesser emergencies included in the agency’s 
integrated infrastructure security plan, albeit incremental, aided the agency’s responses 
(Pearce, 2003). This case shows promise for developing such a framework in a medium-sized 
city. While a well-integrated security framework in medium-sized cities might require a 
phased approach to create due to the limited funding available, it could provide benefits prior 
to its completion.  
California’s standardized emergency management system (SEMS) brings to focus the 
importance of standardization in security frameworks. All state agencies in California are 
required to use this system, as it provides a standard of operation for any agency, event, or 
government level. SEMS development began to coordinate earthquake response and has 
evolved to meet current security needs. Transportation agencies in the San Francisco Bay 
area created their own transportation response plans that coordinated closely with the SEMS 
framework and designates responsibilities and procedures for reacting to emergencies in a 
coordinated manner (Okasaki, 2003). SEMS is akin to a security framework because it 
provides a communication coordination framework for any incident.  
Major metropolitan areas have also demonstrated positive outcomes from the coordination 
and sharing of security information. Particularly, Boston, Massachusetts, began an aggressive 
surveillance coordination project in 2004, in reaction to security concerns for the upcoming 
Democratic National Convention. The project created the Massachusetts Interagency Video 
Information System, which manages video feeds from six different transportation agencies. 
While connecting these various agencies was a goal of the existing regional ITS architecture, 
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these security concerns reduced the completion time of this coordination to only three months 
with a cost of less than one million dollars. The system remains today to aid in the traffic 
monitoring, safety, and security of Boston (Bond et al., 2005).  
Learning from these examples, several other U.S. states and metropolitan areas have 
developed security plans. Detroit, Michigan’s, city security plan identifies ways to use 
existing technology to improve information coordination. Massachusetts’ state-wide anti-
terrorism response network was the first of its kind, proceeded by Arizona’s state-wide 
security strategy (Beaconfire, 2005). The underlying theme in all of these plans is efficient 
and comprehensive communication; also the goal of a security framework. 
2.2 Developing a Transportation Security Framework 
Security plans must enable fast and coordinated reactions to prevent or limit the severity of 
future terrorist attacks and natural disasters. The individual security plans of various agencies 
must follow a city or regional framework to ensure the proper coordination and continuing 
interoperability. Such agency interaction is often difficult due to the varying interests and 
goals of public and private agencies in the transportation industry. Cities of all sizes present 
many potential transportation infrastructure targets to terrorists. Similarly, developing 
security plans to help protect cities brings many challenges. Creating a transportation security 
framework can simplify the process by focusing on responsible agencies, information 
communications between these agencies, and infrastructure components, such as tunnel 
ventilation systems and dynamic message signs. Providing the right information to the proper 
authorities and infrastructure elements can make the difference between repeating the 
mistakes of the past and preventing or managing disasters in the future. 
In the U.S., a regional transportation security framework can coordinate with the “National 
Strategy for Homeland Security” in several areas. Transportation is listed as one of the 
thirteen critical infrastructure sectors in the Strategy, and allocating responsibility through a 
framework, meets the objective of assigning accountability in transportation security (Office 
of Homeland Security, 2005). Creating a transportation security framework will also promote 
initiatives of this strategy, including emergency preparedness and response, science and 
technology, and information sharing and systems (Office of Homeland Security, 2005).  
This paper presents a process for creating a transportation security framework without an 
existing regional ITS architecture, but using the U.S. National ITS Architecture for guidance. 
A similar process can be followed in Europe by referencing both an applicable regional or 
national framework and the European ITS Framework. The transportation security framework 
can contribute to a regional ITS architecture by adding security subsystems, parts of larger 
ITS systems, not already included; and the regional architecture can contribute already 
implemented security subsystems to the new framework. Since the U.S. Department of 
Transportation mandates that any transportation project that includes a federally funded 
technology component, must follow or develop a regional ITS architecture, these 
architectures are becoming more common in medium-sized cities. While this mandate 
ensures interoperability with other technologies, it provides an important tool for building a 
transportation security framework. 
As shown in figure 1, a security framework can be developed in the following steps: 1) 
identifying security risks, 2) selecting security services to mitigate risks, 3) developing a 
concept of operations, 4) developing an implementation plan, and 5) evaluating the security 
framework. This security framework can highlight the security-related subsystems and 
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interfaces from either the local, regional, or national ITS architecture. The U.S. National ITS 
Architecture addresses transportation security in the following areas: disaster response and 
evacuation, freight and commercial vehicle security, hazardous material security, wide-area 
alert, rail security, transit security, transportation infrastructure security, and traveller security 
(National ITS Architecture, Version 5.1). It also addresses how ITS needs to be secured from 
unauthorized use. Leveraging an ITS architecture provides useful information for developing 
the security framework. Standards related to communications or interfaces between security 
architecture entities must be identified to ensure interoperability between diverse agencies 
involved in security preparedness and response. Another important element of the security 
architecture is to identify the requirements for securing interconnects and information flows 
to prevent unauthorized use, so that the system that provides security is secured itself. 
 
 
Regional and 
National ITS 
Architectures 
Identify Security Risks 
Select Security Services to 
Mitigate Risks 
Develop Concept of Operations
Develop an Implementation 
Plan
Evaluate 
Transportation Security Framework
• Historical Data 
• Existing Trends 
• Expert Opinions 
Figure 1. Process for developing a transportation security framework 
Step 1: Identify Security Risks: This step includes an analysis of security risks to the regional 
transportation infrastructure and includes three parts. First, identify areas in the surface 
transportation network that are widely used by the public and are vulnerable to terrorist 
threats, such as transit services, tunnels, and bridges. Second, identify different threat 
scenarios that could lead to the failure of the selected. Last, rank the risks scenarios from 
most probable to least probable in terms of their likelihood to occur. Historical data, existing 
threats and expert opinions will be input to this step.    
Step 2: Select Security Services to Mitigate Risks: This step will identify alternative security 
measures that will mitigate the security threats under each scenario. These security services 
can be selected from the market packages in the National ITS Architecture based on the 
services that are likely to improve transportation security, such as Transit Security and 
Evacuation and Re-entry Management. Some of the security related services already in a 
regional ITS architecture, if it exists, will provide input in selecting the security services. If a 
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regional ITS architecture does not exist at the time of selection the services, then the selected 
services could be used during its future development.   
Step 3: Develop a Concept Operations: This step will identify the roles and responsibilities of 
each stakeholder in operating the security services. This includes identifying data 
requirements of each stakeholder (who will send what data) and communication mediums for 
security threat identification and response once an event has taken place. It is of particular 
importance to ensure the security of communication mediums for incident response as 
terrorists might also try to disrupt these actions. 
Step 4: Develop Implementation Plan: This step includes developing a schedule and budget 
for deploying the selected services based on priority for regional security. This task should 
also include identifying possible funding sources for deploying the security services. Periodic 
deployment tracking should be conducted to evaluate the progress according the 
implementation plan and revise the implementation plan accordingly.   
Step 5: Evaluation: Periodic evaluation will be performed to ensure that the system is keeping 
up with changing security risks, stakeholders, and technology. This task will influence the 
modification of the selection of security services. 
2.3 Case Study of Greenville, South Carolina 
This section of the paper uses Greenville, South Carolina, to illustrate how the process for 
building a regional security framework indicated in figure 1, can be used for developing a 
surface transportation security framework for any city. Greenville was chosen due to its 
proximity along a rail and freeway corridor between two larger cities, Charlotte, North 
Carolina, and Atlanta, Georgia, and the lack of security architecture. Therefore, a security 
incident in Greenville has the possibility to significantly disrupt the transportation systems in 
both Charlotte and Atlanta.  
Greenville is a quickly growing medium-sized city with an international airport; a smaller, 
local airport; but lacks any port for shipping. Greenville provides an excellent role model for 
other medium-sized cities due to its reliance on trucking and rail, allowing the procedure 
presented here to be rather directly applied to other medium-sized cities with no access to 
large waterways.  
Regional surface transportation security frameworks should coordinate externally with state 
and federal strategies for security. As discussed previously, many states have developed their 
own security plans. South Carolina does not have a state-wide emergency management 
system used by all agencies. Instead, each county develops its own including an office of 
emergency management, therefore; security plans are consistent within each county. 
2.3.1 Framework Development 
 
Step one, identifying security risks, was accomplished by an author interviewing personnel 
from several key agencies in Greenville including the district coordinator of the traffic 
management centre (TMC), the director of the Office of Emergency Management, the chief of 
a local fire department, and a captain in the city police department. The list of stakeholders 
was started scientifically by contacting agencies with known transportation security 
responsibilities, such as the TMC, and was then broadened to include additional stakeholders 
according to responses from interviewed agencies. For example, the TMC identified the 
names of railroad agencies operating in the area and they were added to the list of 
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stakeholders to interview. Each agency had different priorities for the future of transportation 
security; for example the city police were interested in recording video data to solve crimes, 
but the TMC was not interested because of the number of copy requests from crash victims 
they would need to satisfy with an already limited staff. The developed architecture needed to 
meet as many of these priorities as possible and the disparity found suggested the need for a 
future workshop involving all applicable stakeholders. While this workshop might identify 
additional differences, it can more importantly identify solutions, such as recording the data 
from only certain cameras, which would satisfy all or most stakeholders. 
The next step was to select security services to the mitigate risks to Greenville’s 
transportation infrastructure. The interviews with the key participating agencies provided 
information on the existing transportation security services and infrastructure in Greenville. 
Presently, the main security tool is closed circuit video. Two separate systems operated by the 
City Police and the TMC total over 125 cameras. These cameras monitor freeways, arterials, 
city streets, and parking garages. Other security infrastructure includes variable and dynamic 
message signs, portable surveillance cameras, and various communication systems. 
Current security services include monitoring, detecting, and verifying traffic incidents, 
providing additional security for special events, and recording video from certain cameras for 
possible future review. In the future, more services are likely to be added. Realistic services 
in the next five years could include sharing all video feed to a central security location and 
expanding monitoring areas. 
To aid in this step Turbo Architecture, a program developed for the U.S. Department of 
Transportation to make architecture development user friendly to transportation professionals 
(National, 2004), was used. The security services selected in this step are classified into 
market packages and are described in table 1. While there is great potential for future 
development in other subsystems beyond this five-year plan, this framework included 
existing and known-planned communication arrangements. 
Step three, developing a concept of operations, identified the participating agencies in 
Greenville, their roles and responsibilities, and the transportation security framework needed 
to provide an information dissemination and communication mechanisms to facilitate 
reaction and recovery from emergencies that might impact the Greenville transportation 
system. The agencies identified and their respective roles and responsibilities, shown in table 
2, demonstrate that linking only the transportation agencies in a medium-sized city involves 
much coordination, providing further justification for security frameworks to coordinate 
security operations.  
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Table 1. Market Packages Selected for Greenville, South Carolina 
Market Packages Selected Description 
Network Surveillance Includes surveillance equipment to monitor infrastructure and traffic conditions 
Surface Street Control Controls local and arterial signal systems to meet demands 
Freeway Control Includes ramp metering, dynamic speed limits, and incident detection 
HOV Lane Management Coordinates ramp meters and signals to improve HOV lanes 
Traffic Information Dissemination Provides pertinent travel information to motorists through variable message signs and highway advisory radios 
Regional Traffic Control Coordinates information sharing between traffic management centres 
Traffic Incident Management 
System 
Manages the detection and management of traffic incidents such as crashes, 
construction, and special events, such as sports 
Weather Information Processing 
and Distribution 
Used to detect conditions such as icy roads, high winds, and dense fog, to prevent 
crashes 
Transit Vehicle Tracking Monitors the location of transit vehicles to update arrival schedules 
Transit Fixed-Route Operations Aids operations management in scheduling and operator assignment 
Demand Response Transit 
Operations 
Aids operations management in routing, scheduling, and operator assignment for on-
demand transit  
Transit Security Provides the physical security for transit passengers and operators 
Transit Maintenance Supports the scheduling of maintenance and service on transit vehicles 
Multi-modal Coordination Communication between different modes to enhance operation 
Transit Traveler Information Provides users with real-time information about timing of stops 
Broadcast Traveler Information Provides motorists with a source for all transportation information 
HAZMAT Management Combines commercial vehicle tracking and incident management 
Emergency Call-Taking and 
Dispatch 
Provides basic emergency call-taking, dispatching, and routing of emergency 
responders 
Emergency Routing Provides updated routing information in real-time 
Transportation Infrastructure 
Protection 
Includes the monitoring of transportation infrastructure and the barricading and 
protecting of infrastructure to prevent incidents 
Wide-Area Alert Uses traveller information systems to alert public about emergencies 
Early Warning System Monitors looming disasters such as approaching hurricanes 
Disaster Response and Recovery Enhances transportation response ability, supports coordination of emergency response, and identifies areas for integration 
Evacuation and Reentry 
Management Provides support during an evacuation and the subsequent return 
Disaster Traveler Information Uses all available means to provide disaster travel information including damage to transportation infrastructure and route changes 
 
The next step in developing the concept of operations is to map the communications between 
each agency. Similar groups of participating agencies were grouped for simplicity. For 
example, all fire and rescue departments were combined as one because geography and type 
of security incident will determine which departments are contacted. Similar circumstances 
lead to combining all police, all railroads, and all health and medical services. These 
communications will most likely evolve according to future input from other organizations 
because not all agencies were available for input towards this framework development. 
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Table 2. Public Agencies and Responsibilities for Transportation Emergency Response 
in Greenville, South Carolina 
 
Emergency 
Management 
Law 
Enforcement 
Transportation 
Agencies 
Office of Emergency 
Management (OEM) 
• Receive info from the State 
Law Enforcement Division 
• Disseminate info to appropriate 
fire/rescue department 
• Disseminate info to appropriate 
police department 
• Disseminate info to Emergency 
Medical Services (EMS) 
• Serve as Greenville’s first point 
of contact for security incidents 
• Disseminate info to the S.C. 
Department of Emergency 
Management (state-wide 
impacts) 
Fire and Rescue 
• Receive info from OEM 
• Receive incident info from 
EMS  
• Disseminate info to OEM 
• Disseminate info to EMS 
Emergency Medical Services 
(EMS) 
• Receive emergency calls from 
citizens 
• Receive info from OEM 
• Disseminate info to appropriate 
Police Department 
• Disseminate info to appropriate 
Fire/Rescue 
• Disseminate info to OEM 
• Disseminate info to TMC 
South Carolina Emergency 
Management Department 
• Receive info from OEM 
Greenville (large disasters) 
Health and Medical Services 
(all hospitals, clinics, etc) 
• Receive info from EMS 
• Receive info from OEM 
• Disseminate info to OEM 
• Disseminate info to EMS 
Spartanburg County Office of 
Emergency Management 
• Receive info from Greenville 
EOC 
• Disseminate info to Greenville 
EOC 
State Law Enforcement Division 
(SLED) 
• Serve as South Carolina’s first 
point of contact from the 
Department of Homeland 
Security 
• Disseminate info to regional 
counterterrorism councils 
(These are considered with in 
SLED for framework 
purposes) 
• Disseminate info to Greenville 
OEM (or any county) 
• Receive info from Greenville 
OEM (or any county) 
Greenville County Sheriff Dept 
• Receive info from OEM 
• Disseminate info to OEM 
• Aid in evacuation traffic 
control 
• Provide Law enforcement 
during incidents 
State Highway Patrol (SHP) 
• Receive info from OEM 
• Receive info from Transport 
Police 
• Disseminate info to OEM 
• Disseminate info to Transport 
Police 
• Aid in evacuation traffic 
control 
• Receive state-wide info from 
the S.C. Emergency 
Management Division 
Greenville City Police 
• Receive info from OEM 
• Disseminates info to OEM 
• Receive info from Greenville 
Fire/Rescue 
• Disseminate info to Greenville 
Fire/Rescue 
• Aid in evacuation traffic 
control 
• Provide law enforcement 
during incidents 
Transport Police 
• Receive incident info from 
SHP 
• Disseminate info to SHP 
Traffic Management Center (TMC) 
• Receive info from police 
departments 
• Participate in evacuation plan 
with incident detection and 
response 
• Traffic management 
• Disseminate traffic video to city 
traffic engineering department 
• Disseminate traffic video to web 
site 
Greenville Transit Authority (GTA) 
• Support evacuation through 
vehicle dedication 
• Receive traffic info from TMC 
• Receive threat info from OEM 
• Disseminate incident info to TMC 
Greenville Spartanburg 
International Airport (GSP) 
• Receive threats from 
Transportation Security 
Administration (TSA) 
• Receive info from Greenville 
OEM 
• Operate separate police and fire 
departments 
• Disseminate info to OEM 
• Disseminate info to TSA 
Norfolk Southern 
(Atlanta, GA and Roanoke, VA) 
• Disseminate incident info to OEM 
 
CSX (Jacksonville, Florida) 
• Disseminate incident info to OEM 
Amtrak 
• Disseminate incident info to OEM 
Greyhound 
• Disseminate incident info to OEM 
Carolina Piedmont Railroad 
• Disseminate incident info to OEM 
Pickens Railway Company 
• Disseminate incident info to OEM 
Greenville City Traffic Engineering 
• Receive TMC live traffic image 
feed 
• Provide signal preemption to 
emergency vehicles 
• Provide signal priority to transit 
vehicles   
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Figure 2 shows an example of what information flows can exist between the Greenville 
Office of Emergency Management and the Greenville Traffic Management Centre. Note that 
while some information flows between both agencies, other information is being only 
received or sent, and this is because of the different data needs, capabilities, and resources of 
each agency. Although all the information flows between the agencies were developed in this 
project, this information will only be released to the appropriate agencies due to security 
concerns. Further, properly presenting the information flows requires a large plan-sheet 
detailing the types of data each stakeholder is responsible for transmitting and receiving. 
Building from this plan-sheet, transportation stakeholders develop or alter their own security 
plans to ensure that while their security plans change over time, they continue to provide the 
needed functionality to the region’s transportation security framework. 
 
Figure 2. Information flow snapshot 
The next step, implementation, outlined the specific projects to materialize the physical flow 
requirements identified in the earlier tasks. Specific projects based on the previous steps 
include the following: 
• Link the Traffic Management Centre video surveillance systems to the City Police. 
• Complete deployment of 800Mhz radios and create dedicated channels for agencies. 
• Expand surveillance areas within the city and along the interstate. 
These projects and others should be prioritized based on the input of participating agencies. 
Funding is expected to play a large role in the deployment schedule. South Carolina, a state 
containing no major metropolitan areas with population greater than 1,000,000, currently 
receives $26 million in annual funding from the Department of Homeland Security, which is 
approximately half of the national average for state funding. Further, South Carolina receives 
no funding under the Urban Area Security Initiative (Department, 2005). Greenville must 
actively pursue both traditional and non-traditional funding sources. South Carolina can 
likely make a more aggressive pursuit of federal funding through various Homeland Security 
administrations, such as the Office of Domestic Preparedness, the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency, and the Transportation Security Administration. State and local 
sources of funding require further investigation. Ideally, South Carolina should dedicate 
funding to the creation and management of security frameworks for the state's metropolitan 
areas; however, a line item in the general fund might stand as a required first step. Local 
funding will likely come through a similar process. In addition, as Greenville develops itself 
as a convention destination, requirements for event security might provide funding for 
Greenville's security much like the Democratic National Convention in 2004 did for Boston. 
Since this security framework has not yet been fully implemented, this example will not 
include the last step, evaluation. 
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2.3.2 Anticipated Use 
 
Stakeholders in Greenville should continue this work by holding a stakeholder meeting and 
conducting tabletop exercises to identify further security needs. This process would need a 
strong champion to lead and organize this meeting and lead this initiative in the future, and 
the Greenville Office of Emergency Management would be an appropriate agency. The 
concept of operations should be reviewed in the meeting to ensure the proper communication 
and coordination among the stakeholders in the event of a security situation. 
Stakeholders can discuss projects to improve transportation security in Greenville. Because 
the transportation security framework only protects one aspect of Greenville’s security 
(transportation), stakeholders can further meld the framework to coincide with other existing 
security plans. This coincidence might include refining the information received and 
transmitted between the TMC and the City Police. The process can produce updated versions 
of figure 2 and table 2. This paper should serve as a tool for law makers and practitioners in 
Greenville and similar cities to coordinate transportation security either as a checklist for 
existing coordination of systems or as a baseline for developing new frameworks. Following 
the guidance of this paper and frequently refining frameworks with input from relevant 
agencies will provide an up-to-date information communication map. While maintaining a 
successful transportation security framework requires input from multiple agencies to update 
risk assessment models and track the deployment and impacts of projects, it will keep 
transportation security professionals informed of the precedence of security needs. Even 
though cost-benefit ratios have traditionally steered the selection of projects, the precedence 
found from a security framework can help decision makers more effectively order projects, 
while ensuring that each project continues to promote interoperability and communication. 
3. Conclusion 
Transportation security is now an important objective of transportation stakeholders, perhaps 
equivalent to safety and mobility. The increasing prevalence of terrorist attacks on less 
secured transportation targets now brings the security of medium-sized cities into focus.  
This paper has presented infrastructure risk assessment tools, infrastructure and funding 
resources, and a process for developing a transportation security framework for a medium-
sized city. This process was demonstrated through a case study of Greenville, South Carolina, 
U.S. While various tools exist to identify security risks and rank projects, working with 
participating agencies to develop this prototype project has demonstrated that the precedence 
of deployment frequently depends on the priorities and funding available to participating 
agencies. Furthermore, this process requires time to bring all stakeholders together to develop 
these priorities. As security is a major concern in cities worldwide, where transportation 
infrastructures at some point are the means for evacuating the population during disasters, the 
importance of having a framework for addressing these security issues related to 
transportation is of critical importance.  
Medium sized cities in the U.S. and the European Union face particularly unique security 
challenges in deploying ultramodern transportation security systems. Though population size 
and existing infrastructure seemingly places these metropolitan areas at a disadvantage as 
compared to larger cities in terms of grant allocations (using U.S. federal funding formulas), 
they have several important advantages. First, their smaller size means that fewer 
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participating agencies must coordinate activities to protect a smaller transportation system; a 
smaller number of participants can typically make decisions and reach agreement more 
quickly than larger groups. Secondly, they can quickly adapt and incorporate a security 
framework into future updates of organizational security plans, which can ensure proper 
coordination and communication to prevent or manage transportation-related security 
incidents. Thirdly, since the vast majority of European cities are similar in scope and 
population to Greenville, lessons from this work easily transfer. 
Future work should investigate the feasibility of non-traditional funding sources for medium-
sized cities to implement security projects identified by a framework, which can ensure 
earlier realization of such projects. Further work should also identify how security 
frameworks differ for medium-sized cities with access to large multimodal facilities such as 
ports, making the findings of this work more broadly applicable. 
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